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Abstract 
Through the development and adoption of technical solutions to address city issues the smart city 
seeks to create effortless and friction-free environments and systems.  Yet, the design and 
implementation of such technical solutions are friction-rich endeavours which produce 
unanticipated consequences and generate turbulence that foreclose the creation of friction-free 
city solutions.  In this paper we argue that a focus on frictions is important for understanding 
civic hacking and the role of social smart citizens, providing an account of frictions in the 
development of a smart city app.  The empirical study adopted an ethnographically informed 
mobile methods approach to follow how frictions emerge and linger in the design and production 
of a queuing app developed through civic hacking.  In so doing, the paper charts how solutions 
have to be worked up and strategies re-negotiated when a shared motivation meets differing 
skills, perspectives, codes or designs; how solutions are contingently stabilised in technological, 
motivational, spatiotemporal and organisational specificities rather than unfolding in a smooth, 
linear, progressive trajectory. 
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Introduction 
A challenging issue that emerges with smart city initiatives concerns the production and pursuit 
of technical solutions. These initiatives are transforming contemporary cities beyond simply the 
amount, speed and diversity of the data that can be automatically generated by sensors and 
humans, and in making infrastructures and services more efficient, productive and competitive. 
More profoundly, the ‘deep analytics’, developed and deployed by companies such as IBM 
(2012) and Motorola (2013), provide a different kind of governmentality wherein algorithms and 
predictions can be trained and improved with real-time data and domain expertise, and urban 
issues can be resolved, or better yet pre-empted, with optimised and automated mechanisms of 
solution generation. A smart city therefore is not only an efficient city. It also seeks to become a 
friction-free city where organising commuting, environmental protection or neighbourhoods will 
be effortless. The erasure of friction will be facilitated by ‘solutionism’ (Morozov, 2013), 
wherein complex and contingent systems are disassembled into component parts and neatly 
defined assumptions and tackled with technical solutions rather than political and policy 
responses.  Here, cities and individuals are replaced by simplistic suppositions about how to 
design and manufacture cities, governments, citizens and consumers (Zwick & Knott, 2009; 
Vanolo, 2013).   
 In the main, such innovative city solutions are envisaged as being provided by companies 
rather than public bodies.  However, the public are also not short of innovative strategies and 
solutions to respond to difficult problems. In the context of emergency situations, for example, 
‘voluntweeters’ comprising computing scientists and volunteers create virtual ‘disaster desk’ that 
mobilises core members and other local and global volunteers to collect, translate, organise and 
verify tweets for providing fast, reliable and effective ways of situation awareness and resource 
coordination (Starbird & Palen, 2013). WiFi publics, including artists, activists, geeks, students 
etc., provide community owned and maintained communication channels by engaging in the 
infrastructure setup, augmenting local communities and discourses on the political implications 
of community WiFi (Powell, 2008). These are only two of many other cases where individuals 
motivate and organise themselves to gain deeper understanding of science or engagement with 
computing technologies for envisioning and building alternative futures for pressing community, 
humanitarian or environmental issues.   
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 In various ways, voluntweeters and wifi publics are partial solutions to the issues that 
motivate their endeavour. Further, their strategies often inadvertently result in further challenges 
to their causes. This partiality of solutions is unavoidable and the untidiness in the field of 
operating strategies and organising participations can be more widely shared and further 
conceptualised. As Urry's (2014) reworking of wicked problems demonstrates, the effort of 
designing and producing future cities is always situated in complex interdependencies in which 
one solution reveals or creates further problems and the conditions of defining problems and 
sourcing solutions can inform each other and change over time. This friction-rich journey of 
working up solutions and adjusting strategies is particularly important in civic hacking where a 
complex and interrelated urban issue can ‘hack’ any reductionist software/hardware solutions and 
imaginaries (Sassen, 2012).   
 This paper provides an empirical account of such frictions and argues for their theoretical 
significance in conceptualising civic hacking and social smart citizens. The research adopts the 
ethnographically informed approach of mobile methods (Büscher et al., 2014) to follow how 
frictions emerge and linger and thus how solutions have to be worked up and strategies re-
negotiated when a shared motivation meets different skills, perspectives, codes or designs under 
the context of civic hacking meetups. For example, in one meetup, a police representative was 
invited to participate allowing one of the projects to get a sense of how they might obtain 
necessary data and improve their algorithms and prediction results for wait time in a government 
office. The session, however, was turned into energised discussion about all sorts of possible and 
technologically enhanced solutions for acquiring data, and the regulatory difficulty, legal and 
technical concerns, and practical and organisational issues that could emerge from those possible 
solutions. The lessons were learned by the project members, and became their local knowledge 
and even ‘collective memory’, refreshed when new members joined and asked why there could 
not have been a more brilliant solution than using unreliable, crowdsouced data captured from 
Foursquare and Twitter, and from other opportunistic, ‘guerilla’ data collections. To further 
analyse this and other projects and the solutions they pursue, the paper draws on science and 
technology studies, anthropology, design studies and CSCW literature to unpack the necessary 
relationships between solution and friction (Tsing, 2005; Suchman, 2011). 
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The case study 
This empirical focus of the paper is the meandering process of developing a queuing app in a 
friction-rich process, by drawing from ethnographic research that follows how solutions are 
worked up (Büscher et al., 2014) at various civic hacking events during 2014 and 2015 in 
Dublin. The initiative in question, Queuing App, is one of the many projects that are currently 
pursued by Code for Ireland members. The rationale and idea behind the project are relatively 
straightforward. The project leader is an immigrant who shares a similar sense of frustration with 
nearly 97,000 other immigrants living in Dublin with respect to the long wait in the GNIB 
(Garda National Immigration Bureau) office, where immigration registration and renewal take 
place (Central Statistics Office, 2011). For these people, a trip to the GNIB office in Dublin 
requires a pre-registration for the day of their visit, to turn up on the day to collect a number 
sheet, then a long wait to be called for processing. The GNIB office runs a first-come-first-served 
system, and thus queues can start to form outside of the office well before it opens and the 
experience is a collectively shared pain. Social media are often the place where applicants 
express their discontent, albeit in light-hearted ways. One applicant started queuing around 6.25 
am and felt ‘awesome’ being ‘the first 10 people’ in the queue; at 7.30 am, another reported that 
there were ‘already THOUSANDS’ in the queue; yet another commenting ironically on the 
growing of an international community ‘known as the #GNIB’1
 The aim of the Queuing App project is to provide an estimate of queuing time, as 
demonstrated in Figure 1, so that these applicants can better manage their time, or simply wait 
elsewhere and return to the office when it is their turn. The project is pursued as part of Code for 
Ireland, Dublin chapter, which organises monthly meetups to attract technologists and people in 
the community or government to meet, network, identify problems and explore solutions. As a 
civic organisation, the ideas of transparency and inclusiveness are foregrounded, which have 
implications on how participants are encouraged to contribute their skills and how individual 
projects make progress (Maalsen & Perng, in press). In terms of ‘the solution’ for the Queuing 
App project, it has gone through a number of sessions of brainstorming, discussion, negotiation 
and adjustment. After the first two meetups, the participants identified their working solution to 
.  
                                                     
1   Discussion obtained from querying Twitter search website (http://twitter.com/search-home) using 
the keyword and hashtag GNIB, and the tweets quoted above were posted between 2013 and 2014. 
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Figure 1: GNIB queue solution 
 
 
 be the design and implementation of a GNIB office ‘Queuing App’ to provide queue time 
estimation. They planned to create an API to transform the data they obtained via a Google form, 
process them in a spreadsheet to validate the input, and calculate the wait time by considering a 
range of factors (e.g. day of the week, numbers of tickets issued already, average processing time 
per ticket on the day, etc.). The validation and calculation result can then be viewed in a 
dynamically refreshed webpage to show when each ticket holder is likely to be served, and in the 
app version push notifications can be sent to the users reminding them to go back the GNIB 
office. Also, a text message version of receiving input and communicating results was suggested 
and investigated to serve non-smartphone users.     
 The remainder of the paper focuses on the meetup where the project leader invited a 
garda, an Irish police officer, who has a background of IT and various police work, to participate 
in the event and flesh out their plan. This session quickly turned into a series of explorations, 
frustration and confusion, leading the project to undertake an approach that has little 
technological sophistication and requires significant communication with relevant government 
agencies, individuals in the queue or shops and cafes near the GNIB office. This resonates with 
the process of urbanising technology (Sassen, 2012) where a particular technical solution is 
energised by sociotechnical expectations about the efficiency it can create and then ‘talked back’ 
due to a number of issues: the willingness of the people to share, contribute and donate their 
skills, the complexity of a city, its path dependencies, bureaucracy or simply the unwillingness to 
 6 
change. Accordingly, in this paper, we seek to articulate the uneasy relationships between 
government agencies, technologists participating in civic initiatives, openly created and shared 
code, and different expectations involved in shaping ‘the solution’.  
 To further make sense of such relationships, the next section discusses civic hacking 
using the lens of 'frictions' and the following section explores how frictions arise during the 
attempt to align government agencies, technologists, codes, technologies and innovation, as well 
as subsequent problems they then generate. Civic hacking events provide a ‘place’ for the 
encountering of the above actors and the messy and sticky relationships emerging from these 
encounters are crucial to start unpacking practices of designing solutions.  
 
Solutions, innovations and frictions 
Hacking within the context of free and open source software have different genres (Coleman & 
Golub, 2008), and civic hacking is underpinned by the values of transparency and access. 
Critiques of civic hacking include its effect of  shifting responsibility away from the government 
for dealing with issues (Johnson & Robinson, 2014) and also the homogeneous demographics 
behind the solutions put forward, which is a more general concern for any crowd-based 
initiatives (Brabham, 2008). Moreover, individualised interests and initiatives can be treated as 
wider urban problems and thus the problems, what constitutes the civic, and the design of 
solution can become problematic (Mattern, 2014).  
 Taking Mattern’s point further, the process of designing and innovating solutions in civic 
hacking requires careful rethinking. An anthropological study of design and innovation can be 
useful here, for several reasons. First and foremost, drawing on postcolonial scholarship, it is 
argued that innovation develops from contingent and uncertain situations. A knowledge- and 
investment-intensive hub of innovation is enacted by particular and specific sociomaterial 
arrangements to sustain it as a precarious centre (Redfield, 2002). In a similar vein, the ‘origin’, 
the defining moment and the progressive trajectories of development all have to be critically re-
examined to attend to the promises and imaginaries articulated through and enabled by the 
practices and micropolitics within design and innovation (Suchman, 2002). More often than not, 
mis-aligned aims, identities and practices lead to negotiations that acutely reveal that ‘progress’ 
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is seldom a streamlined and linear process and willing and unwilling adjustments have to be 
made in order to draw out a solution that can be accommodated by differently involved 
individuals, cultures and organisations (Davies, Tybjerg, Whiteley, & Söderqvist, 2015).   
 This brings us to the notion of friction initially proposed to understand the global 
connections of science, capitalism and politics and how the pursuit of their universal dreams, 
claims and knowledge are situated in the friction-rich, 'sticky materiality of practical encounters' 
(Tsing, 2005, p. 1). For Tsing, these global connections attempt to achieve their claims of 
universality by acquiring content and force within specific historical and local conjunctures. To 
become universal is to travel across differences, therefore the encountering with local 
specificities becomes an important site where widened and new arrangements of knowledge, 
cultures and ideas emerge, which change and charge them, enabling them to move across 
different cultural aspirations, and yet with the impossibility to specify definite courses and 
consequences:  
Friction makes global connection powerful and effective. Meanwhile, without even 
trying, friction gets in the way of the smooth operation of global power. Difference can 
disrupt, causing everyday malfunctions as well as unexpected cataclysms (Tsing, 2005, p. 
6). 
Civic hacking operates in quite different social and technical contexts than environmental 
protection, from which the metaphor and arguments are developed. Nevertheless, friction 
provides an effective framework to start articulating the encounters among the individuals, 
governments, codes and technologies enmeshed together through the Code for Ireland initiative. 
The following discussion provides an initial analysis of the frictions emerging from such 
encounters and the different kinds of problems that are only partially solved, in ways participants 
expected or unexpected, as well as creating new problems that have to be dealt with when the 
project carries on.    
 
Remaking queues in the city 
The Queuing App project has had participants with various skills and backgrounds joining and 
leaving the project since its inception. The diversity of the participants has shaped and adjusted 
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the strategies adopted at various stages of pursing the solution that the project established in the 
first few meetups. One of the most important meetups was when a conversation with a garda 
became possible after several attempts of contacting the police, explaining the motivation and 
inviting them to discuss the idea. In the meetup, the preparation beforehand facilitated the 
discussion with the garda. However, this does not mean a smooth propagation on the project’s 
agenda for the day. Rather, the ideas and questions prepared for the meetup were instrumental for 
the project to try and explore alternative solutions when the one being pursued hit a wall. More 
importantly, by working out what is technologically, organisationally and operationally 
(im)possible, this rather short and circulatory process of probing and redirecting questions for the 
garda sustained frictions between the individuals, organisations, passions and coding capabilities 
that firm up the proposed solution of the Queuing App project and various strategies created at 
later stages to support it. This section provides a glimpse of such processes of working and 
firming up ‘the solution’ through mutual frustration and necessary optimism.  
 Before the project met the garda, the participants had already had several ideas in mind 
that they wanted to try, test and implement, which all required obtaining relevant data to start 
calculating estimated wait time. Without knowing exactly what data they could obtain from the 
government, the participants started by sizing up the types of queue related data the GNIB office 
might have and how these data could potentially be transformed into useful estimations. 
Therefore, the first challenge they faced was turning chaotic queues and the obscure, if not 
entirely unavailable, sources of data into a streamlined process of estimation.  
 Clues from the photos of the ticket, which applicants received at the GNIB office and 
which circulate via  social media, e.g. Foursquare and Twitter, were worked on to extract useful 
information. Printed on the ticket, photo on the left in Figure 1, include the date and time when 
the ticket was issued, the number an applicant is assigned, and the number in the queue. From 
these data, the following information can be deduced: the number of applicants arriving before a 
specific ticket is issued (from the assigned number) and the number of applicants who are still 
waiting to be served (number in the queue). Also, the date and time provide contextual 
information about how long the office has opened and the speed of processing applications on 
that day.  
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 The information extracted from ticket photos can start to generate a rough estimation of 
wait time. The photos are a reliable source of data in the sense that the date, time and numbers 
can be clearly captured. But the problem is that the number of available photos is too small to 
roll out the estimation and respond to the dynamic nature of queues: busy hours and seasons or 
complexity of particular applications can seriously affect the time other applicants have to wait. 
The logical solution to this is to enlarge the pool, although it is not a simple task.    
 To start, a Google form was designed, allowing applicants to upload their ticket details 
via the form for the project to crowdsource the data of different time and days when the GNIB 
office accepts applications. This creates its own problems. By replacing photos with an online 
data entry form, the physical correspondence between sources of data (pictures saved on 
computer) and the extracted information (e.g. applications already processed speed of the day) 
becomes uncertain. This raises considerable concerns over the validity of each data entry and the 
reliability of the information and ultimately the calculation of wait time. Thus, other mechanisms 
have to be in place and a Google spreadsheet was created to validate and process incoming data.   
 Indeed, a collection of ‘sheets’ needed to be created to turn raw social media and later 
volunteered data into useful data, before they can start to tell anything about the queue. Opening 
hours on different days of the week are kept in one sheet and the raw data gathered from pictures 
shared in social media in another. As partially captured in Figure 2, the main sheet, aptly entitled 
‘calculations’, is a constellation of logical and arithmetic functions (in the red area in the figure) 
that seek to determine whether there are errors within the entry of a particular user, accidental or 
otherwise, and how to best use the extracted data for calculating wait time. For example, Column 
P takes into account all pieces of data extracted from individual tickets to assign a score to each 
row of data according to their quality for estimating queue time.   
=if(B4="","",countif(G4:O4,FALSE))    
Above is the function behind the column, which reviews several aspects of the ticket and the 
queue to evaluate the data. They include whether the numbers related to the queue are entered 
correctly; if a ticket is taken too early in the day to tell how the queue progress in that day; if the 
data are provided when the applicant is in the queue; or if the ticket is taken within the opening 
hours. Each of these aspects is transformed into a TRUE or FALSE statement in the columns 
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leading to Column P where a score is given by counting the number of FALSE between Column 
G and O to determine the data quality of each row.     
 
Figure 2: Becoming useful data 
 
 
 
 These aspects of a ticket create various kinds of expectations regarding how valuable 
insights extracted from them can streamline the queue in the GNIB office. The ‘intelligence’ that 
can be extracted from a single ticket can tell if it is near real-time queue data; if someone is 
providing fake data; how the progress of a particular day compares with others; how the 
variation of processing speed affect wait time on that specific day, which days, hours or seasons 
are more congested than others; or how a particular ticket should be given more ‘weight’ in the 
process of estimating wait time. These expectations and the streamlining of the queuing problem 
also echo corporate discourses and the ‘smartmentality’ that transforms urban issues into 
algorithms and predictions of differing complexity (Vanolo, 2013).  
 The process of developing the spreadsheet reveals the ‘contextual effectiveness’ of the 
solution. That is, the solution is momentarily effective, contingent upon different kinds of contact 
that can be made because of the project and the endurance of such relationships in terms of 
withstanding continual, oncoming challenges. The spreadsheet became stablised as the solution 
when the project started, because the richest points of contact with the people affected by the 
queue came from social media. Other resources they started with were rather limited, including 
the lack of response from the police, leading the design of the spreadsheet towards validating 
self-provided data. Also, the project gained considerable traction among Code for Ireland 
participants because of various problems and promises that are at play when cities confront 
technologies, and vice versa. The process of extracting intelligence about the queue from very 
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limited sources of information is a tricky task and it is this trickiness that makes some 
participants tick. This motivation, however, has to be contextualised by the shared frustration of 
participants and the expectations and exploration of what they could do differently. At times, it is 
an exploration of ‘marketing strategies’ to encourage applicants in the GNIB office to upload 
their queue details, and in others, strategies for getting necessary data reconsidered by 
authorities. At these occasions, personal contacts with relevant departments are offered for 
initiating another discussion on the queuing problem and the project within the government, 
alongside suggestions regarding possible deployment of the solution at other public offices 
where the physical office and personnel might be more receptive. These different offerings are 
set in motion because of the shared distress, as well as the opportunity of participating in 
cracking open a small window to an enduring, widely encountered and yet neglected problem.  
 In addition to contextual effectiveness, the ‘progress’ of developing the solution cannot 
be separated from the friction occurring from the attempt of relocating technological artefacts 
into new sociomaterial arrangements of objects, social entities and activities (Barry, 2001). The 
solution to the queue in the GNIB office bears similarities with advanced capabilities of data 
analytics that often feature ‘deep’ understanding of the data and real-time adjustment of estimates 
according to continuous streams of data flows. However, the development of the capabilities of 
the analytics is different in practice. Starting out with the expectations to provide dynamically 
adjusted wait time estimation, the project  has reduced in its scope, stripping them down to a 
simpler estimate of wait time and the opening hours and address of the immigration. This 
'progress' arises from inviting the garda to discuss the solution with the project members.    
 At the meetup, the project members were divided into two groups: one listening to 
project updates and the other explaining the project idea to the garda. However, as the field note 
below shows, while sympathetic towards the project, the garda was not sure about the rationale 
behind the initiative. The idea behind the project is straightforward from the participants' 
perspective. But when the idea came into contact with the garda and his previous experience of 
community police work, it suddenly lost its attractiveness:  
When I joined, the garda was listening to the project explaining its motivation, but he 
looked a bit confused. It was suggested that helping build the app could benefit the police 
because this can reduce the amount of work the police needs to handle when people come 
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to ask for information or help. So he raised the point, from a community service’s 
perspective, you would want people to come to talk to us.  
Meeting with community members face-to-face is an important mechanism for them, as the 
garda further explained, because it fosters building up rapport between the police and the 
community. The burden from the project's perspective is actually an advantage that community 
policing seeks to establish. This mis-positioning of the project's expectation became a setback to 
the strategy of attracting the buy-in from the police.  
 At this point, the conversation continued, but with a slight change of focus that tried 
again to bring closer the alignment with the police to pursue the solution. This time, the emphasis 
was placed on exploring the possibility of setting up an automated process of collecting queuing 
data. This topic was discussed in both groups, one going through some technical possibilities and 
the other seeking comments from the garda, before the two groups merged to involve the whole 
project in the conversation. Since then, this topic grew into a recurrent theme, one that tried to 
conceptually hack into the IT system in the GNIB office but inevitably became the object of the 
hack of the organisational and technological complexity of the office. Throughout the discussion, 
many suggestions were provided. They asked if the agency keeps any record of the number of 
applications received on each day. However, the garda suspected that the ticket machine only 
does the issuing of tickets and is not connected to any application database. As a result, such 
records might not exist. This meant two different sets of tactics for the project. One is to 
convince the agency that granting the project access to the record, providing it exists, has real 
benefits to applicants and the agency alike. But this might be a long process before receiving a 
response. The other set of tactics involved coming up with different technical arrangements to 
extract data from the physical office, and these strategies, in their turn, excited and disappointed 
the participants.    
 The most exciting piece of information they uncovered was that the ticketing machine is 
a closed system and not connected to any application database. This was encouraging in the 
sense that, by only getting the numbers of applications received at the office, security threats and 
privacy concerns would become less serious an issue for the project since no personal data would 
be obtained, nor unintended and unauthorised access to immigration data would become possible 
due to the initiative. The project could obtain near real-time data about the flows of the incoming 
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applicants and prediction results could adapt to the change of the flows constantly. Various 
strategies were then proposed to take advantage of this discovery. One project member suggested 
a hardware hack that taps into the ticketing system to count and time the issuing of tickets. 
Another proposed that they install a camera in the office to stream the image of ticket numbers 
shown on the digital display in the office for optical character recognition. A supplementary 
comment pointed out the camera should be equipped with data exchange capability to send out 
the images. Inspired by the conversation, a fourth participant added that the camera could also 
show how crowded the office is in real-time, as well as the counters to see how many are taking 
applications and the rates of processing them.   
 The envisioning of new technical arrangements encountered more complications. The 
idea of installing a camera in the office triggered privacy concerns because applicants can be 
unwillingly captured by the camera. Indeed, the angle of the camera can be adjusted so that it 
only captures the image of the digital display and nothing else, as one participant revised the 
plan. But the receptiveness of the agency was largely unknown and difficult to anticipate due to 
the organisational, jurisdictional and spatial intermingling of the office. The GNIB office is 
shared and jointly controlled by the Department of Justice and the police. Installing a camera in 
the physical office would involve planning and negotiating with both agencies, understanding the 
sensitivity levels of the space, their respective ticketing systems, different roles and functions 
performed by the staff, and organisational willingness to collaborate or concerns over adopting a 
system which can be appropriated to evaluate efficiency. Even the details of the model and make 
of the ticketing machine or the digital display were difficult to obtain on the day, because it was a 
Saturday, outside of normal office hours when civic hacking events tend to happen. Furthermore, 
using existing infrastructure in the office would be most cost-effective to upload the captured 
image for subsequent processing, but the Internet connectivity in the office is integrated with the 
standalone security system for the police, and to apply to gain access to the infrastructure adds to 
another layer of difficulty were the strategy to be adopted.  
 After the discussion with the garda, the project members were far from convinced that 
crowdsourcing would be the most efficient strategy to acquire data, although this approach was 
firmed up as the strategy to pursue the project. It nonetheless comprises effective sociotechnical 
arrangements with which the project can gain traction among participants and mobilise their 
ideas and skills to develop the app, and a related website that aims to provide relevant 
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immigration information and communication contents to continue lobbying the agency. They 
also planned to put on stickers or flyers in the GNIB office to encourage queue ticket holders to 
upload their ticket details, as well as establishing partnerships with cafes and shops nearby to 
increase flyer exposure.  
 Furthermore, the process of working up the strategy of crowdsourcing data allows 
technologies to effect and change as a way of materialising the differences and syntheses of 
expectations associated with the individuals, initiatives and organisations that become involved 
in the project (Mackenzie, 2013). Crowdsourcing data as a strategy might not be the most 
innovative one, and it is developed under precarious sets of encounters and relationships. But it 
possesses instrumental value in that the calculated wait time starts to make sense after several 
attempts of marketing the project to people in the queue. It also generated symbolic value when 
the project received attention from the news and renewed interest from the GNIB office, 
although the real scope of cooperation remains uncertain. There still remains a gap between the 
instrumental and symbolic value, which provides a reminder of how government and everyday 
undertakings and urban problems are differently prioritised and materialised in the misalignment 
of expectations. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has sketched out how solutions are worked up and become stablised and supported 
because of effective arrangements of various precarious relationships. Identifying and developing 
a solution involves a certain level of streamlining the problem. It has been argued that frictions 
are instrumental elements in the process of developing technologies to address urban problems. 
Understanding solutions in terms of the frictions a civic hacking project encounters and endures 
also highlights that the new sociotechnical arrangements developed to address an urban problem 
depend on the extent to which specific sets of relationships between participants, skills, 
expectations and technologies can be stabilised to support the initiative. Accordingly, developing 
a solution also requires a commitment to establishing the contextual effectiveness of a solution 
by relocating technologies, objects, skills, motivations and expectations. In the example of the 
Queuing App, photos of queuing tickets have to be worked into a spreadsheet and the 
spreadsheet has to accommodate the situation where only limited information can be extracted 
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from the ticket. Furthermore, expectations articulated by and associated with participants, 
relevant agencies, technologies and objects might align, contradict or have missed opportunities 
to connect. At the same time, these expectations can be situated in technical and organisational 
contexts that are too complex and entangled for a civic initiative to tackle in full. Such is the case 
with the Queuing App project. The initiative signals the problem, designs possible solutions, 
reveals the untidy spatial relationships within the GNIB office, and focuses on the aspect of the 
problem where the expectations of different entities can materialise into effective sociotechnical 
arrangements.   
 It is these practices, encounters and frictions, rather than simply the innovativeness and 
newness of artefacts and project ideas, that provide a start to engineering a social smart city. 
Recognising ‘the incompleteness of cities’ (Sassen, 2012) is a beginning of disclosing the 
interdependencies of a problem when solutions are designed to sensitise and respond to frictions 
emerging from relocating sociotechnical arrangements and expectations to solve the problem. 
Understanding civic hacking in terms of friction then foregrounds that its solutions are 
contingently stabilised in technological, motivational, spatiotemporal and organisational 
specificities, and that a progressive trajectory of development is far less important than 
articulating what are the people, skills, technological requirements, organisational cultures and 
frames and understandings of problems are enabled, particularised, marginalised, sidelined or 
excluded in the course of designing and mobilising specific solutions.  
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